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All or Nothing, or Maybe
Cooperation: Attorney General
Power, Conduct, and Judgment in
Relation to the Work of an
Independent Counsel
by John Q. Barrett*
I. INTRODUCTION: KENNETH STARR'S MONIKER
The question of what to call Ken Starr is not merely a provocation to
commentators across the opinion spectrum. It relates to a serious legal
argument that was made in 1997 litigation involving Starr and his
office. It also relates to a larger, more complicated issue under the
current independent counsel law:' the allocation of power and authority
between independent counsel, who are temporary prosecutors operating
within jurisdictional limits, and the Attorney General of the United
States, who continues during independent counsel investigations to serve
as the nation's chief law enforcement officer and to head the United
* Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law. Georgetown University
(A.B., 1983); Harvard University (J.D., 1986). Email: jbarrett@sjulawfac.stjohns.edu.
Thanks to Dean R. Lawrence Dessem, Associate Professor James P. Fleissner, and the
faculty, staff, and students of Mercer University's Walter F. George School of Law for their
hospitality and for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this Article at the
Symposium on the Independent Counsel Statute. Thanks also to.Kathleen Clark, Jim
Fleissner, Katy Harriger, Susan Stabile, and Brian Tamanaha for their very helpful
comments, and to Anne Marie Troiano, Anthony M. DeFazio, Edward W. Flis, and
Jeanmarie A. Marquardt for excellent research assistance on various independent counsel-
related matters. Although I served as Associate Counsel in the Office of Independent
Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh from 1988 to 1993, this Article reflects solely my own views.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
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States Department of Justice, which is a central institution of the
permanent United States government.
The legal argument regarding Starr was a very small part of one piece
of finished litigation relating to the investigations and prosecutions that
Starr-who is the "Whitewater" independent counsel, although his
jurisdiction embraces many more subjects and allegations than Bill and
Hillary Clinton, Jim and Susan McDougal, and their 1970s real estate
investment'--has been conducting since his appointment in August
1994. In June 1996 a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District
of Arkansas directed a subpoena duces tecum to the White House.' The
subpoena required production of notes of interviews and meetings that
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton had with White House officials on
a range of Whitewater-related topics. The White House responded to the
subpoena by giving Starr a "privilege log.' It identified nine sets of
notes that were responsive to the subpoena and stated that the White
House refused to produce the notes based on various claims of legal
privilege.
5
In August 1996 Starr filed a sealed motion asking the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to compel the White
House to produce two of the nine sets of notes that had been subpoe-
naed.' Each set of notes had been created by a White House lawyer, not
a private lawyer.
2. See, e.g., Order, In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1, at 1-2
(D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Jan. 16, 1998) (expanding Starr's jurisdiction to include, among other
things, jurisdiction to investigate "whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury,
obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law other than a
Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses,
attorneys or others concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton").
3. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1997).
4. Id. at 913-14.
5. Id. at 914.
6. Id.
7. Id. The first set of notes was created during a meeting in the White House residence
on July 11, 1995. According to the White House privilege log, the meeting concerned
Hillary Clinton's activities following the 1993 death of Deputy White House Counsel
Vincent W. Foster, Jr. The meeting was attended by three people: Mrs. Clinton; the lead
attorney from the private law firm that President and Mrs. Clinton retained to represent
them in Whitewater matters; and the White House lawyer who created the notes. The
second set of notes was created on January 26, 1996 at meetings during and immediately
following Mrs. Clinton's testimony before a federal grand jury that Starr and his staff were
working with in Washington, D.C. These meetings were attended at various times by up
to five people: Mrs. Clinton; her lead private attorney; a second partner in the law firm
representing the Clintons; the then White House Counsel; and the White House lawyer
who created the notes.
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Starr, litigating on behalf of the grand jury, won the ensuing legal
battle to obtain the White House lawyers' notes, but it took him a full
year to do so." The grand jury issued the subpoena in June 1996. In
April 1997 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
ruled in Starr's favor.9 In a ringing but sealed majority opinion, the
court rejected the claim that there is a government attorney-client
privilege that can frustrate lawful federal criminal investigations, such
as the investigation by the Arkansas grand jury.1" Although the White
House sought Supreme Court review of this ruling (unsealing the matter
in the process and thus bringing it to widespread public attention), the
Court denied the White House's petition seeking a writ of certiorari.11
The foregoing leads to the issue of Starr's moniker. In both the
district court and the Eighth Circuit, the litigation over the two sets of
White House attorney notes that were responsive to the subpoena was
captioned "In re" a grand jury matter. 2 This caption is in accord with
the convention for government motions of this type and appeals from
denials thereof. When the matter moved to the Supreme Court,
however, the private attorneys retained by the Department of Justice to
represent the White House filed their petition for a writ of certiorari
with the case caption, "Office of the President v. Office of Independent
Counsel.""3 What they were calling Starr, in other words, was conspic-
uously not "the United States."
Like many federal prosecutors before him, Starr and his client, the
United States Government, had been "dissed" in court pleadings by the
adversary being investigated. Surprisingly, however, in the brief filed
in opposition to the White House petition, Starr responded to his
8. Id. at 913. The litigation began in August 1996. In November 1996 the district
court ruled in favor of the White House. Id. at 914. The court held that the subpoenaed
notes were protected by attorney-client privilege and as attorney work product. Id. Starr
appealed, still under seal, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Id
9. Id. at 925-26.
10. I d at 924.
11. Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
12. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to the White House, No. GJ-96-3, slip
op. (E.D. Ark. Nov. 26, 1996), rev'd and remanded, 112 F.3d 910, 926 (8th Cir. 1997).
13. 112 F.3d 910, cert. denied, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel,
117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
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adversary's rhetorical jab.14 Starr devoted the last two pages of his
brief to what he described as
a procedural point: The current caption of this case is directly contrary
to the independent counsel statute... and to this Court's consistent
practice.
The issue also plays itself out in the cauldron of trials. Opposing
counsel at times prefer to label prosecutors as "the independent
counsel" and to state or imply that the prosecutors do not represent the
United States.
The caption of this case, by referring to the "Office of Independent
Counsel," directly contradicts [the independent counsel law]. It is the
law, not convention, which establishes that this Office, within its
jurisdiction, possesses the full "authority to exercise all investigative
and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice
[and] the Attorney General" and is responsible for handling "all aspects
of any case, in the name of the United States .... ." Neither the
governing statute nor this Court's practice admits of an exception when
the other party before the Court is a separate entity within the
Executive Branch. As to that issue, moreover, there is controlling
precedent: United States v. Nixon. 5
Although Starr's written demand to be referred to in case captions as
"the United States" rather than "the Office of Independent Counsel" may
seem petty and even a little bit prissy,' consider the next development
in the case. Following the filing of Starr's brief in opposition, the
Department of Justice filed its own brief urging the Court to grant the
White House's petition for review."' In this matter, which pitted an
14. In this regard Starr was tracking to a degree, perhaps without knowing it,
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's approach in 1989 Supreme Court litigation with
the Department of Justice over procedures for handling classified information in a criminal
trial. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 34 (1990) (noting that "Walsh's papers filed at the
Supreme Court were captioned not 'United States v. Oliver North,' but 'Dick Thornburgh,
Attorney General v. Lawrence Walsh, Independent Counsel'") (italics in original).
15. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 28-30, Office of the President v.
Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 594(a)) (footnote omitted).
16. Cf Daniel Klaidman, DOJ's Bumpy Ride, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 22 & 29, 1997, at 8
(awarding Starr 1997's "'Don't You Have Anything Better to Do?' Award" for"insisting that
his office be identified as The United States' in his brief in a Whitewater-related case
before the Supreme Court"). His adversaries ignored Starrs "procedural point" in their
subsequent filing. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Office of the President v. Office of
Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783).
17. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, Acting Through the Attorney
General, Supporting Certiorari, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel,
117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783).
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independent counsel against the White House and drew the Department
of Justice in on the side of the latter, the Department called itself, of
course, "the United States.""8
This short-lived tussle over the nameplate that reads "the United
States" gave voice, if only for a moment, to a deep and fundamental
tension that has run through the experience of many independent
counsel. An independent counsel is, by law, appointed to stand in the
place of the Attorney General and is given, with some exceptions, many
of the Attorney General's legal powers.'9 Starr was, in other words,
correct: legally, the independent counsel is "the United States," just as
regular federal prosecutors, up to the level of the Attorney General, are
"the United States" in non-independent counsel cases.
As an independent counsel goes forward to investigate and, if
necessary, prosecute criminal cases, however, the regular, permanent
United States-the executive branch of the national government-is all
around. It includes the Attorney General and the Department of Justice
that she commands, including its components and personnel." From
an independent counsel's perspective, the rub is that this regular United
States government continues to command many of the powers, resources,
and personnel that an independent counsel needs to work promptly and
successfully.
This Article considers the allocation of power under the independent
counsel law between the Attorney General along with the Department
of Justice and the independent counsel whose appointment the Attorney
General has triggered. Although the law explicitly transfers much of an
Attorney General's lawful power to an independent counsel, it does not
go far enough in reallocating that power. Thus, it leaves a fundamental
gap between what the current statute purports independent counsel to
be and what it actually empowers independent counsel to accomplish.
Part II of this Article reviews the current legal provisions, including the
allocations to independent counsel of powers that ordinarily would
belong to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Part III
considers some instances in which the powers that the law or custom
reserves to the Attorney General have been exercised to complicate or
18. See id. at 1-2 (stating "Interest of the United States").
19. 28 U.S.C. § 594 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
20. The regular United States government that surrounds an independent counsel also
includes Congress and the federal courts. Because independent counsel are appointed to
perform executive branch functions at the request of and serve under the ultimate
authority of an executive branch official, the issue that I am considering is largely intra-
executive branch. For a discussion of independent counsel interactions with legislative and
judicial actors, see KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL
PROSEcuTOR IN AMERICAN PoLrIcs 149-53 & 156-61 (1992).
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impede the work of independent counsel. Part IV proposes statutory
modifications that would allocate further power to independent counsel.
Part V considers some of the challenges that would arise and the
political consequences that might flow from these proposed statutory
modifications.
I conclude in Part VI that an empowered independent counsel might
have better working interactions with an Attorney General and the
Department of Justice, facilitating quicker and more satisfying outcomes
to independent counsel investigations. In the alternative, even if
empowering independent counsel vis-&-vis the Attorney General would
result in more visible and frequent political showdowns-between
Attorneys General and independent counsel or between Presidents and
independent counsel-this too could be healthy for our larger govern-
mental processes.
II. THE PRESENT ALLOCATION OF POWER BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND AN INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
The independent counsel law contains explicit and quite detailed
provisions regarding the allocation of power between the Attorney
General, who ordinarily is responsible for federal law enforcement, and
an independent counsel, who is appointed at the Attorney General's
request to investigate matters within a court-ordered area of jurisdic-
tion. 1 These provisions give much of the Attorney General's investiga-
tive and prosecutorial authority to the independent counsel.' In
return the law places some obligations on the independent counsel with
regard to the Department of Justice.' The independent counsel law
also explicitly provides that certain specified powers and responsibilities
will remain exclusive to the Attorney General notwithstanding the
appointment of an independent counsel. Finally, there are issues of
investigative, prosecutorial, and managerial authority that the indepen-
dent counsel law does not explicitly address.
A. What Goes Over: The Statute's Reallocations of Power from the
Attorney General to an Independent Counsel
Section 594 of the Independent Counsel Statute is the primary
provision that transfers powers ordinarily belonging to the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice. It provides the following:
21. See 28 U.S.C. % 591-99.
22. Id § 594.
23. Id.
[Vol. 49524
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an independent counsel
.. shall have, with respect to all matters in [his or her] prosecutorial
jurisdiction .. ., full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department
of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of
the Department of Justice ... .
Another provision in the statute clarifies that this power and authority
are exclusive to the independent counsel.25 Once an independent
counsel has been given a defined jurisdiction, the Attorney General and
the Department of Justice, including all of its officers and employees, are
required to cease investigations and proceedings regarding that
matter.28
The independent counsel law specifies that an independent counsel's
exclusive "investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers"2
include the following:
* consulting with the United States Attorney for the district
where the alleged violation of law that led to the appointment of the
independent counsel occurred;'
* conducting grand jury investigations and other (unspecified)
investigations;29
24. Id. § 594(a). The only stated exception to this provision is that the Attorney
General must continue to exercise direction or control over matters that specifically require
her personal action under 18 U.S.C. § 2516, which governs applications to intercept oral
and wire communications. See id. § 594(a).
25. Id. § 594(i).
26. See id. § 597(a). Cf. id. § 594(e) (recognizing the Attorney General's authority to
refer, on her own initiative, a matter to an existing independent counsel that relates to his
prosecutorial jurisdiction). The only exceptions to this cease-and-desist directive are
circumstances when the independent counsel has either requested the Department's
assistance with his work or stated in writing that the Department may continue
investigations or proceedings on its own. See id. § 597(a).
The statute does not address whether the Department may continue to exercise in
proximity to an independent counsel's defined area of jurisdiction its traditional
noninvestigative and nonprosecutive functions. These include providing legal advice and
representation to components and employees throughout the executive branch. See infra
Parts II.D. and II.A.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a).
28. Id. § 594(aX10). The statute also directs the Department to provide whatever
assistance and information an independent counsel requests to carry out his functions. See
id. § 594(d)(1). Therefore, the provision regarding United States Attorneys seems unneces-
sary.
29. Id. § 594(a)(1).
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* reviewing all the documentary evidence that is available from
any source;
30
* receiving "appropriate" national security clearances;"
* inspecting, obtaining, and using, consistent with applicable
statutes, original tax returns or copies of tax returns;3 2
* applying for warrants, subpoenas, and other court orders;-,
* determining whether to contest the assertion of any testimonial
privilege;34
* contesting in court (including in in camera proceedings) any
claim of privilege or attempt to withhold evidence on national security
grounds; 35
* applying in any federal court for an order granting use
immunity to any witness; 6
* filing informations; 37
* framing and signing indictments; s
* initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent
jurisdiction; 9
* litigating any civil or criminal matters that the independent
counsel "considers necessary";'
30. Id. § 594(a)(4).
31. Id. § 594(a)(6).
32. Id. § 594(a)(8).
33. Id. § 594(aX7).
34. Id. § 594(aX5).
35. Id. § 594(a)(6).
36. Id. § 594(a7). An independent counsel may also authorize an administrative
agency to give use immunity to any person who is refusing, based upon the privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or to give information to the agency. See id.
(authorizing independent counsel to exercise the authority that 18 U.S.C. § 6004 vests in
the Attorney General). An independent counsel may also cause a United States District
Court to defer issuing for up to twenty days an order that has been requested by a duly
authorized member of Congress or a committee of Congress to grant use immunity to any
person. See id. (authorizing independent counsel to exercise the authority that 18 U.S.C.
§ 6005 vests in the Attorney General).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(9).
38. Id.
39. Id An independent counsel also has "full authority" within his area of prosecutori-
al jurisdiction to "dismiss matters ... without conducting an investigation or at any
subsequent time before prosecution, if to do so would be consistent with the written or
other established policies of the Department of Justice" regarding criminal law
enforcement. Id. § 594(g).
40. Id. § 594(a)(2).
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* appealing court decisions in any case or proceeding in which the
independent counsel has participated in his or her official capacity;4'
and
* "handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United
States."4
2
In addition to these provisions, which transfer much of the Depart-
ment of Justice's ordinary investigative and prosecutorial authority and
power to an independent counsel, the law directs the Department to
provide any assistance that the independent counsel may request.
This assistance may take the form of information." It also may include
the Department's human resources.4 Taken literally, the law permits
independent counsel to draft Department of Justice bodies, and it directs
the Department to deliver them. The law also directs the Department
to "pay all costs" relating to operation of an independent counsel's
office."
B. Paying for What Goes Over: The Independent Counsel's Duty to
Follow Department of Justice Policies
Although the independent counsel law transfers substantial power and
authority from the Department of Justice to the independent counsel
within his area of jurisdiction, the law also creates explicit duties that
independent counsel comply with Department policies.
The law directs independent counsel to observe "the written or other
established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement
of the criminal laws."47 Because knowledge of Department policies is
an obvious prerequisite to compliance, the law directs independent
counsel to "consult" with the Department about its criminal law
enforcement policies.' The law also directs independent counsel to
comply with the Department's procedures and guidelines for handling
41. Id. § 594(aX3).
42. Id. § 594(aX9).
43. Id. § 594(d)(1).
44. See id. ("[Assistance ... may include access to any records, files, or other materials
relevant to matters within such independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction .... ").
45. See id. ([A]ssistance... may include... the use of the resources and personnel
necessary to perform [the] independent counsel's duties. At the request of an independent
counsel, prosecutors, administrative personnel, and other employees of the Department of
Justice may be detailed to the staff of the independent counsel.").
46. Id. § 594(d)(2).
47. Id. § 594(f(1).
48. Id. § 594(f(1).
1998] 527
MERCER LAW REVIEW
and using classified information.49 An independent counsel must also
consult with the Department' and comply with its expenditure
certification policies."
The only basis upon which an independent counsel may decline to
consult with the Department or decide not to follow its criminal law
enforcement or expenditure policies is when doing so "would be
inconsistent with the purposes" of the independent counsel law. 2 The
statute defines no exception to the independent counsers duty to comply
with Department classified information guidelines and procedures.
C. What Stays Behind: The Statute's Reservations of Power to the
Department of Justice and the Attorney General
Although the statute gives much power and authority to independent
counsel and imposes corresponding duties on them to communicate with
the Department and to obey its policies in the ordinary course of events,
the law also leaves specified powers in the Department of Justice.
Notwithstanding the statutory provisions that give independent
counsel the powers to conduct criminal prosecutions, to litigate any civil
or criminal matters they consider necessary, to appeal court decisions in
their cases and proceedings, to obtain any requested assistance from the
Department of Justice, and to handle all aspects of cases "in the name
of the United States,' the law does explicitly reserve one litigation
function to the Department. The statute preserves the ability of the
Department of Justice to appear in independent counsel litigation by
permitting it to appear as amicus curiae on legal issues." The law
states that its provisions "shall [not] prevent the Attorney General or the
Solicitor General from making a presentation as amicus curiae to any
court as to issues of law raised by any [independent counsel] case or
proceeding" or any appeal therefrom.55
The independent counsel law also gives the Attorney General the
power to remove an independent counsel from office. This removal
49. Id. § 594(fX2).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 594(IX)(C).
52. Id. § 594(f)(1).
53. Id. § 594(aX), (2), (3), (9).
54. Id. § 597(b).
55. Id. The Department of Justice made use of this provision in June 1997 when it
filed a brief in the Supreme Court supporting the White House petition for a writ of
certiorari in the litigation with Independent Counsel Starr over the grand jury subpoena
for notes created by White House attorneys. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United
States, Acting Through the Attorney General, Supporting Certiorari, Office of the President
v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 98-178a).
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power is defined with great specificity. The statutw provides that the
removal of an independent counsel will be valid only if it is the personal
action of the Attorney General.66 Also, removal must be based on "good
cause, physical or mental disability" of the independent counsel, or "any
other condition that substantially impairs the [independent counsel's]
performance" of his duties.6 7 The law also permits the Attorney
General at any time to ask the appointing court to terminate an
independent counsel's office on the grounds that his investigation and
resulting prosecutions have been "completed or so substantially complet-
ed" that it is appropriate for the Department of Justice to finish the
work."
D. Powers That Are Not Expressly Transferred from the Attorney
General to an Independent Counsel
To summarize the foregoing, within the confines of an independent
counsel's investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction, the independent
counsel law allocates virtually all power and authority from the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice to an independent counsel. The
law makes this reallocation through general provisions that define an
independent counsel's power and authority and through the numerous
provisions that detail specific acts that an independent counsel may
take. The law does not, however, address what happens in an indepen-
dent counsel case to each type of power that the Department traditional-
ly exercises. The law also does not contain an omnibus provision that
transfers all Department authority and power that is not explicitly
reserved for the Attorney General. It is therefore not surprising that the
observation of independent counsel interactions with Attorneys General
and the Department of Justice in various independent counsel investiga-
tions suggests that some powers may be up for grabs. This section
identifies three examples of traditional Department of Justice powers
that Attorneys General have claimed, either explicitly or implicitly
through conduct, remain with them and in the Department notwith-
standing the appointment of an independent counsel and the provisions
of the independent counsel law.
One traditional Department function that the independent counsel law
does not address explicitly is the Department providing legal advice, and
56. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
57. Id.
58. Id § 596(b)(2). Even without a request from the Attorney General, the appointing
court may on its own motion terminate an independent counsel's office on this same basis.
14 Also, the statute suggests that an independent counsel could be removed from office
through impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate. See id. § 596(a)(1).
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even legal representation by Department attorneys, to entities and
officials throughout the executive branch. In non-independent counsel
cases, the Department regularly functions as counsel to Cabinet and
regulatory agencies and their employees.59 In certain civil proceedings,
the Department also provides its attorneys to represent fellow govern-
ment employees who have been sued or called to testify individually as
non-party witnesses.' The common characteristic of these settings is,
of course, that the litigation, investigation, or proceeding at issue is not
being brought by the United States (that is, the Department). The
independent counsel law, which gives a private attorney the power to
investigate and litigate as the government within his defined area of
jurisdiction, thus creates settings for legal activity that differ fumdamen-
tally from those where the Department typically provides legal advice
and representation to other parts of the executive branch. Independent
counsel nonetheless have found that, in proximity to their jurisdictional
areas of responsibility and even directly in litigation against them, the
Department of Justice continues to provide its traditional legal advice
and representation even though it means that it is now lining up against
"the United States."
1
A second traditional function that Attorneys General have claimed to
retain even after appointment of an independent counselfis the power to
decide what classified information may be used in open court to permit
the prosecution of a criminal case. In a non-independent counsel case,
the Attorney General has the power to place the Department's interest
in criminal law enforcement over an intelligence agency's interest in
continual protection of its classified information from public disclo-
sure. 2 Thanks to the provisions for pretrial evidentiary rulings
contained in the Classified Information Procedures Act," the Attorney
General can make this determination to proceed with a criminal
prosecution based upon advance knowledge of the costs it will entail for
national security. If an intelligence agency chooses to contest an
Attorney General's decision to proceed with a case at the cost of causing
particular classified information to be disclosed publicly, its only
recourse is to appeal to the President, who can order the Attorney
General to desist. Although the independent counsel law all but
explicitly reallocates this authority from the Attorney General to an
59. See id. §§ 511-513 (1993); 28 C.F.R. § 0.5(c) (1998).
60. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 543, 547 (1993).
61. See infra Part IIIA.
62. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 3-16 (1985 & Supp.
1998).
63. Id. § 6.
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independent counsel within his prosecutorial jurisdiction,"4 Independent
Counsel Walsh found during his Iran-Contra prosecutions that Attorneys
General continue to seek to exercise this traditional Department of
Justice powers.'
A final traditional function that Attorneys General have claimed to
retain is the power to decide whether and how the authority and the
personnel of the Department of Justice's Office of the Solicitor General
will be deployed in appellate litigation. The independent counsel law
provides that the independent counsel may litigate in the name of the
United States and utilize Department of Justice personnel at his
discretion.67 However, when notable court cases have arisen, indepen-
dent counsel have found that Attorneys General and Solicitors General
continue to claim and exercise independent discretion to determine
whether to support the independent counsel's legal position in a trial or
appellate court or before the United States Supreme Court."
IIl. ATTORNEYS GENERAL EXERCISING POWER IN THE JURISDICTIONAL
AREAS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
This Part discusses examples of Attorneys General employing these
traditional powers in areas of investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction
that have been given to independent counsel by court order. In
identifying these examples, I am not suggesting that the Attorneys
General deliberately flouted the independent counsel law. Each of these
instances concerns a traditional Department of Justice prerogative that
the independent counsel law does not unambiguously transfer from the
Attorney General to the independent counsel. I am suggesting that
Attorneys General have not rushed to identify restrictions on their
powers that are implicit in the independent counsel concept and
statutory scheme. Also, independent counsel have not been aggressive
about claiming or protecting for themselves exclusive control over these
functions. The result has been a series of Department of Justice actions
that have complicated, if not undercut, the work of independent counsel.
64. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See infra Part UI.B.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 594(aX9).
67. I. § 594(dXl).
68. See infra Part IIIC.
1998]
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A. Legal Advice and Representation
The Department of Justice calls itself "the largest law firm in the
Nation."0' Among its fundamental purposes, it exists to provide legal
advice to the rest of the government.7 Department lawyers regularly
counsel the managers and other employees, including attorneys, who run
the executive branch departments and myriad other entities, on all
manner of legal and policy issues."' Department lawyers also defend
these entities in litigation brought against them (i.e., in lawsuits against
the United States), and also in the legal proceedings that these entities
initiate. Department lawyers also provide legal representation to or,
alternatively, the funds to pay for private attorneys to represent
individual executive branch employees when they are involved in
litigation or other proceedings that are connected to or arise out of their
work on behalf of the United States."2
To date, the Department of Justice and its personnel have not ceased
to give legal advice and even representation to executive branch
departments, entities, and personnel when independent counsel have
been appointed to investigate persons and alleged criminal misconduct
in the same governmental office or policymaking locale. Instead, as a
few examples illustrate, the Department has continued to perform its
traditional legal advising and representational functions regarding
executive branch personnel who are, along with their departments and
69. See Department of Justice web site, <http://www.usdoj.gov>; Cf Ross L. Malone,
Jr., The Department of Justice: The World's Largest Law Office, 39 A.B.A.J. 382 (1953).
70. See generally NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND PoLmcs iN THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 1789-1990, 4-18 (1992).
71. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 511 (1994) (directing the Attorney General to give "his
[sic] advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President"); 2 UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY's MANUAL § 1-2,101(c) (Aspen Law & Business ed., 1990-1 Supp. at 1-15)
(stating the Attorney General's authority to "[flurnish advice and opinions, formal and
informal, on legal matters to the President and the Cabinet and to the heads of the
executive departments and agencies of the Government, as provided by law"); 28 U.S.C.
§ 512 (1994) ("he head of an executive department may require the opinion of the
Attorney General on questions of law arising in the administration of his department.");
28 U.S.C. § 513 (1994) (directing Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, in the absence
of some more specific statute giving responsibility to some other officer, to send any
question of law that arises in the administration of their respective Departments "to the
Attorney General for disposition"); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (1997) (assigning the Department's
Office of Legal Counsel to "renderd] informal opinions and legal advice to the various
agencies of the Gvernmente).
72. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 514 (1994); Daniel Klaidman, The High Cost of Turning
Back Whitewater's Tide; Cash Strapped Officials Cope With Daunting Legal Bills, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1994, at 1 col. 2 (reporting that federal regulations permit reimbursement
for legal fees incurred by officials who are called to testify on Capitol Hill).
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agencies, in the midst of dealing with an independent counsel investiga-
tion:
* During Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz's investigation of
former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy, the Department paid for
private legal counsel to defend a White House claim of executive
privilege in grand jury litigation with the independent counsel.7"
* During Independent Counsel Starr's Whitewater investigation,
the Department financed the private legal counsel who defended the
White House's unsuccessful claim of attorney-client privilege in grand
jury litigation with the independent counsel.74
* The Department agreed to reimburse some White House
employees for the costs of private attorneys who assisted them in
providing testimony before Congressional Committees whose inquiries
paralleled other aspects of Starr's investigations.75
* During Starr's more recent investigation of Monica Lewinsky
and others who were involved in Paula Jones's civil suit against
President Clinton, the Department paid for private attorneys to defend
the President's reported invocations of executive privilege."
73. See James Rowley, Not Just Whitewater: White House Fighting Espy Counsel Over
Papers, ASSOCIATED PRESS REP., May 15,1997, 1997 WL 4866389 (reporting that "Attorney
General Janet Reno authorized the White House to hire a private law firm to handle the
grand jury litigation"). See generally In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(identifying the private counsel who represented the White House in this litigation against
Independent Counsel Smaltz).
74. See Frank J. Murray, Reno Opposes Starr Bid for Notes, Affirms "Privilege" Claim
By Clinton, WASH. TIMES, June 7, 1997, at Al (reporting that private counsel were
representing the Office of the President in litigation against Independent Counsel Starr
and noting that that "development means that three parties represented by lawyers paid
by the Department [of Justice] are in one case claiming to represent interests of the United
States"); see also Saundra Torry, The Court Took Notes, and Some Attorneys Take
Exception, WASH. POST, May 12, 1997, at F7 (reporting that the private attorneys
representing the White House were charging the government only a "special bargain rate"
of "$54 an hour for the lawyers' time").
75. See Michael Kirkland, UPI Focus: DOJ Not Involved in Executive Privilege, UPI
WIRE SERV. REP., Feb. 19,1998 (reporting the Department of Justice's announcement "that
it has approved thousands of dollars in outside attorney fees incurred when lawyers
represented the White House during investigations of the White House travel office firings
and receipt of FBI file summaries on Republicans"); Karen Gullo, U.S. Paying Bills of
Clinton Aides, CHATrANOOGA TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1997, at A9 (reporting similar reimburse-
ment payments during the previous year).
76. See Marcia Coyle & Harvey Berkman, Executive Privilege Finds a Champion, NATL
L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at 1 (profiling attorney W. Neil Eggleston); Cf. Letter from Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to Attorney General Janet Reno, Apr. 16,1998, at 2 (mentioning
"the positions the Department has taken on the various [claims of] testimonial privileges
that are hindering our investigation").
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* During the same phase of Starr's investigative activity,
Department attorneys first consulted with, and later represented in
litigation, the Department of the Treasury and United States Secret
Service officials who claimed a privilege not to testify about their
observations, if any, of President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky.77
These examples are only a glimpse of the many instances in which
Department of Justice personnel communicated with and provided advice
or other support to entities and persons who were of central investiga-
tive interest to independent counsel who had been assigned to investi-
gate, on behalf of the United States government, alleged criminal
activity. These examples illustrate how customary Department legal
advice and representation can create situations of direct conflict between
it and an independent counsel. At the extreme, the Department's legal
advising can thwart the very work that an independent counsel was
appointed to carry out.
None of this Department of Justice activity is, on its face, inconsistent
with the Independent Counsel Statute, federal criminal law, or any other
legal authority. Although independent counsel receive, fully and
exclusively upon their appointments, the government's powers to
investigate and, if crime is found, to prosecute, the Department of
Justice activities just described are neither investigative nor prosecutori-
al. They are legal advising, which is among the other, more nuanced
legal services that the Department properly provides every day to its
"clients." The government's need, along with the needs of the nation and
the citizenry, for the Department to provide such services through expert
personnel who can draw upon its institutional knowledge and history
typically is not affected very much, if at all, by the appointment of an
independent counsel. What the independent counsel law leaves
unaddressed, however, is who is and who should be responsible for
assessing those broader needs when they arise in proximity to, or in
direct response to, an independent counsel's work. By default, and
according to the ordinary processes of government, that task of
assessment has fallen in independent counsel cases where it falls in non-
independent counsel cases: to the Department of Justice.
The problem with the current state of affairs, at least from the
perspective of an independent counsel who has been assigned to conduct
an investigation, is that the Department's continuing ability to give legal
77. See Robert Suro, Justice Department to Fight Starr on Forcing Secret Service to
Talk, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1998, at A7; Phil Kuntz & Brian Duffy, Justice Agency, Urged
by Secret Service, to Fight Starr's Bid to Get Clinton Bodyguards to Testify, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 1998, at A24.
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advice and to provide legal representation to entities and persons who
are involved in some way in an independent counsel investigation may
complicate, and in some instances it may even impede, the investigation.
The presence and support of Department attorneys, or of Department-
financed private attorneys, also may communicate to current or former
government employees who are having to deal with an independent
counsel that he is not really the government, that his demands are not
really the lawful demands of federal law enforcement, and other
messages that undercut his legitimacy as a federal investigator and
prosecutor.
Executive branch entities and employees are not wrong, in an
independent counsel investigation, to do exactly what they usually do
when legal issues arise in their regular courses of conducting govern-
ment business-turn to the Department and seek its legal advice and,
if necessary, its representation. It would send a significantly different
message than current practices do, however, if the independent counsel
law or an Attorney General directive unambiguously required Depart-
ment personnel to respond to such requests for legal assistance by
saying "Before I do anything in this area, let me see what the indepen-
dent counsel wants me to do with this."
B. Controlling Classified Information
The Iran-Contra investigation was replete with classified information.
The investigation concerned two major covert foreign policies-trading
arms to Iran in exchange for the freedom of United States citizens taken
hostage in Lebanon, and supplying a war against the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua-and focused on virtually every national
security and intelligence component of the executive branch. To prove
Iran-Contra crimes, Independent Counsel Walsh needed to use in open
court proceedings classified information that otherwise would not have
seen the light of day for decades, if ever.78
In ordinary criminal investigations and prosecutions that touch upon
classified information, the Attorney General has legal authority to
balance law enforcement interests in making a particular criminal case
against more generalized national security considerations. When the
Attorney General determines that law enforcement must come first, she
may use the classified information needed to make the criminal case
unless directed otherwise by the President. 9
78. See generally PETER KoRNBLUH & MALCOLM BYRNE, THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL:
THE DECLASSIFIED HISTORY (1993) (National Security Archive document reader).
79. See generally Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent
Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales ofJusticeAfter Iran.Contra, 91 COLuM. L. REv.
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Although the independent counsel law does not address this power
explicitly, it seems to reallocate implicitly to independent counsel the
Attorney General's traditional powers over classified information. The
law provides that, as a baseline power, independent counsel are entitled
to receive "appropriate national security clearances.se Above that
baseline, the statute also spells out an independent counsel's ultimate
authority to get, and thus arguably his authority to use, classified
information. The law says that if someone attempts by general
withholding or by claiming a national security privilege to keep an
independent counsel from obtaining the classified information sought,
the independent counsel may go to court to enforce the legal right to
obtain the information."1 Justice Scalia asserted in 1988, in a little-
noticed passage of his much-noted lone dissent from the Supreme Court
decision upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel law,
that this authorization gives an independent counsel more power to
reject intelligence agency concerns than the Attorney General possesses
in non-independent counsel cases. 2
In the Iran-Contra cases, however, this implicit transfer of power ran
into political reality. The Attorney General asserted ultimate control
over classified information. In two instances, Attorney General
1651, 1657-63 (1991); Ronald K. Noble, The Independent Counsel Versus the Attorney
General in a Classified Information Procedures Act.Independent Counsel Statute Case, 33
B.C. L. REv. 539, 550-56 (1992).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6). This is a specification of an independent counsel's more
general powers to obtain any testimony and to review any document.
81. See id.
82. Justice Scalia wrote the following about an independent counsel's statutory power
to litigate against national security privilege claims:
Another preeminently political decision is whether getting a conviction in a
particular case is worth the disclosure of national security information that would
be necessary. The Justice Department and our intelligence agencies are often in
disagreement on this point, and the Justice Department does not always win. The
present [Independent Counsel] Act even goes so far as specifically to take the
resolution of that dispute away from the President and give it to the independent
counsel.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); but
see Appeal of United States (By the Attorney General), 887 F.2d 465, 471 & n.6 (4th Cir.
1989) ('The Act plainly does not affect the Attorney General's authority to protect
information important to national security by filing a[n] ... affidavit .... [Section
594(aX6) only] contemplates the situation where the Executive Branch seeks to withhold
from independent counsel evidence arguably relevant to the prosecution on grounds of
national security ... ").
Although Justice Scalia's reading of section 594(aX6) may be technically correct, his
narrow focus on this provision in isolation of course ignored the larger reality of the
Attorney General's general power under the act to terminate an independent counsel's
appointment. See infra Part V.B.
1998] AG POWER & CONDUCT IN IC CASES 537
Thornburgh fied affidavits based upon the power he ordinarily would
have under the Classified Information Procedures Act and ordered that
specific items of classified information could not be used in public trials.
In Oliver North's prosecution, the trial court responded to the Attorney
General's affidavit by dismissing the two lead counts of the indict-
ment." In the prosecution of CIA officer Joseph Fernandez, the trial
court responded to the Attorney General's affidavit by dismissing the
entire indictment." Although Independent Counsel Walsh could have
sued to establish his statutory authority over classified information, he
declined to do so at various junctures for various reasons." The
practical result was that once Walsh failed to persuade the Attorney
General that the particular interests of law enforcement in these cases
were more weighty than the national security concerns of the intelli-
gence community, the prosecutorial powers of an independent counsel
effectively were limited by a decision of an attorney general.86 This is
at odds with the fundamental purpose and the general provisions of the
independent counsel law itself.
83. See generally LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FiNAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 109-10 (1993); LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FuEWALL: THE IRAN-
CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 180 (1997).
84. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 149 (4th Cir. 1990); WALSH,
FIREWALL, supra note 83, at 218-19.
85. In North, Walsh agreed to accept Attorney General Thornburgh's filing of the
affidavit barring use of classified information and thus the dismissal of counts one and two
of the indictment in return for the Attorney General's commitment that he would permit
the twelve remaining counts to be tried. In Fernandez, Walsh decided to appeal from the
district court's pretrial relevancy determinations regarding classified information and its
dismissal of the entire case rather than litigate against the Attorney General's assertion
ofpower. See Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 150. At the Symposium on the Independent Counsel
Statute, Walsh said that "I never asked Congress to consider giving [the classified
information power] to an independent counsel because I did not think a transient should
be making decisions about national security where he has no deep background in that area.
And it seems to me that there are areas where the interpretation of the law should be in
the hands of those who are permanently stewards of it, rather than in a transient."
Symposium, A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 453, 483 (1998).
86. The Attorney General also sought to stay jury selection in North and Fernandez in
efforts to force Walsh to take pretrial appeals from the trial courts' classified information
rulings. Although the Department of Justice briefly obtained a stay of the North trial, see
WALSH, FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 111, two courts of appeals ultimately rejected the
Attorney General's claim of authority to take interlocutory classified information appeals
in cases being prosecuted for the United States by independent counsel. See id. (describing
unpublished decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit that "the attorney general had no standing to appeal"); Appeal of United States (By
the Attorney General), 887 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1989).
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C. Withholding Solicitor General Support in Litigation
Although the Independent Counsel Statute explicitly directs the
Department of Justice to provide whatever personnel and assistance an
independent counsel may request, no independent counsel has sought to
exercise this power in the form of ordering the Solicitor General to
handle or to support the independent counsel's litigation position.
Independent counsel have asked for Solicitor General or other litigation
support, but Attorneys General have not uniformly granted these
requests.8 7
Independent Counsel Walsh's experiences in Iran-Contra illustrate
this failure to command or obtain the Department's support and
expertise in appellate litigation. In 1987 Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North and Vice Admiral John Poindexter, two of the central Iran-Contra
operatives who previously had invoked their Fifth Amendment privileges
against self-incrimination," were compelled by court order to testify
before the Congressional Select Committees that were investigating
Iran-Contra. North and Poindexter received use immunity from the
court in return for their compelled testimony.8 9
When Walsh's office subsequently obtained criminal indictments
against them, North and Poindexter aggressively litigated claims that
the government had made prohibited use of the immunized testimony
through the indicting grand jury, the prosecutors, and their trial
evidence. The trial courts ultimately found no merit to these claims.
North and Poindexter were convicted by juries and sentenced90
However, the immunized testimony argument was successful on
appeal.9' In each case Walsh then petitioned for Supreme Court
87. When Independent Counsel Gerald Gallinghouse, for example, had to defend the
constitutionality of his appointment in litigation brought by his named subject, former
Carter reelection campaign chairman Timothy Kraft, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
denied Gallinghouse's request for legal representation by the Department and also his
request for funds to hire private counsel. See HARRIGER, supra note 20, at 145.
The Department of Justice has, at independent counsel request, filed amicus briefs
supporting the independent counsel's position in a number of matters. For example, in
Independent Counsel Starr's first criminal prosecution of then Arkansas Governor Jim Guy
Tucker, the Department filed an amicus brief supporting Starr's position on the
"relatedness" of Tucker's conduct to matters within Starr's primary areas of jurisdiction.
See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States Department of Justice, United States v.
Tucker (8th Cir.) (No. 95-3268) (filed Oct. 12, 1995).
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. See United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
90. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
91. Id
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review. Career prosecutors in the Department of Justice viewed the
appellate opinions as unprecedented and so sweeping that they
threatened the Department's institutional interests in preserving the
conceptual distinction between use immunity and transactional
immunity. Although Walsh, through special counsel, negotiated with the
Solicitor General to obtain the Department's support for his petitions
seeking Supreme Court review,92 the Department ultimately decided to
sit those cases out. The Supreme Court declined to hear either case. 8
North and Poindexter were legally victorious. They arguably defeated
a litigation adversary that was less of "the United States" than the law
means for an independent counsel to command."
A related point is the filing of amicus briefs. In litigation that
independent counsel were conducting on behalf of the United States,
Attorneys General filed amicus briefs taking legal positions that opposed
the positions advocated by independent counsel. Unlike the exercise of
traditional Department of Justice powers, these amicus brief filings are
explicitly authorized by the independent counsel law."" This authoriza-
tion suggests that Congress and the President, in enacting the law,
probably did not contemplate that independent counsel would otherwise
direct appellate litigation practices of the Solicitor General's office. It is
hard to imagine how the law could be interpreted to allow both
independent counsel and the Attorney General, each and separately, to
direct the Solicitor General or any other appellate specialist within the
Department to represent opposing legal positions in the same matter.
My point is a broader and simpler one. The independent counsel law,
by authorizing the Attorney General and the Solicitor General to file
amicus briefs, may undercut the independent counsel's litigation
92. Walsh's special lead counsel in each appeal to the Supreme Court was Andrew Frey
of Mayer, Brown & Platt, formerly a senior career attorney in the Office of the Solicitor
General. The Solicitor General who declined to support Walsh and Frey was former Judge
Kenneth W. Starr. In 1997 Frey was the private lead attorney who was hired with
Department of Justice approval to represent the White House in litigation against
Independent Counsel Starr over the grand jury subpoena for White House attorneys' notes.
Ironically, but not surprisingly, when the White House sought Supreme Court review of
the court of appeals order enforcing the subpoena, the Acting Solicitor General (the
Department) filed an amicus brief supporting Frey (the White House) against Starr (the
independent counsel).
93. United States v. North, 500 U.S. 941 (1991); United States v. Poindexter, 506 U.S.
1021 (1992).
94. Cf WALSH, FIREWALL, supra note 83, at 282 ("Having lacked the Solicitor General's
support, I had entertained only a slim hope that the Supreme Court would review the
[North] case.").
95. 28 U.S.C. § 597(b).
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prospects and his broader credibility with both the courts and the
general public.
Two examples demonstrate the amicus brief problem. In Iran-Contra,
the Department of Justice, without first consulting Independent Counsel
Walsh or giving any advance notice to his office, filed an amicus brief
shortly before Oliver North's trial," The brief supported North's
pretrial motion to dismiss the lead count of the indictment against him,
which was the allegation of an overarching Iran-Contra operational
conspiracy. Walsh's office had to prepare and file a quick response to
the Department's brief from the blind side. Although Judge Gerhard A.
Gesell, the trial judge, promptly found the Department's amicus brief
and North's motion to be legally baseless and sustained the validity of
the charge,97 the amicus brief still had effect. It contributed to a public
relations campaign against the propriety of the conspiracy charge. It
also set up Attorney General Thornburgh's decision a few weeks later to
withhold the classified information that would have permitted the
conspiracy to be tried. This decision ultimately forced Walsh to scuttle
the conspiracy charges brought against each of the first five Iran-Contra
defendants.
The Department of Justice also has filed at least one known amicus
brief opposing Independent Counsel Starr in pre-1998 Whitewater
litigation. In 1996 and 1997, Independent Counsel Starr's efforts to
enforce the grand jury subpoena for White House attorney notes of
meetings with the First Lady culminated in the White House's unsuc-
cessful petition for Supreme Court review.' Starr's office reportedly
negotiated with the Department of Justice, seeking-as opposed to
ordering-its support. The Department instead filed an amicus brief
supporting the White House's petition." Although at least six Supreme
Court Justices were not persuaded,' 0 the Department's brief contribut-
ed to negative reporting and public perception of the merits of Starr's
ongoing work.
Each of these examples--the Department of Justice providing legal
advice and representation to other government components and
96. See WALSH, FIREWALL, supra note 83, at 173.
97. See United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
98. See Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997)
(denying petition for writ of certiorari).
99. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, Acting Through the Attorney
General, Supporting Certiorari, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel,
117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783).
100. See 117 S. Ct. 2482.
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employees; the Department controlling classified information; and the
Department withholding Solicitor General support in litiga-
tion-illustrates how the Department and independent counsel come into
actual conflict. It is important to note, however-both to give Attorneys
General the benefit of the doubt, and as matters of likely fact-that the
Attorneys General and other senior Department personnel who directed
such activities almost surely did so based on their principled views of the
legitimate, ongoing legal interests of the permanent United States
government.
The Attorney General and the Department of Justice are assigned, as
a permanent matter, to safeguard the nation's legal interests, which
cover a myriad of situations and concerns beyond criminal law enforce-
ment. An independent counsel, by contrast, is assigned only to
investigate and, if necessary, to prosecute criminal activity in a defined
area of jurisdiction. The Independent Counsel Statute responds to the
danger that political or personal connections to the alleged violators
could cause an Attorney General to care too little about law enforcement
in particular cases. But it also creates a danger that an independent
counsel, caring too much or only about his particular cases, may
disregard the broader legal interests that the Attorney General
ordinarily would represent.
IV. ENHANCING, OR JUST RECOGNIZING, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
AUTHORITY OVER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Recognizing the legitimate interests of both Attorneys General and
independent counsel, it is nevertheless clear that the power and
effectiveness of independent counsel can be diminished by Attorneys
General. Even without explicit legal authorization, Attorneys General
have directed the Department of Justice to continue to exercise in
independent counsel cases some of the prosecutorial and other preroga-
tives that it would possess in ordinary federal cases. The result is
independent counsel who are, beneath the trappings of their title and
the munificence of their resources, much less powerful than the
Department of Justice would be had it not been required, based on the
statute's conflict of interest principles, to relinquish these investigations
in the first place. And this reality is problematic to the extent that we
believe in the policy judgment of the statute itself: in certain circum-
stances, the Department of Justice should be replaced by an independent
investigator. The solution to this problem would be to empower
independent counsel vis-&-vis the Attorney General.
The cleanest way to empower independent counsel would be through
statutory amendments that make their enhanced powers explicit. For
example, the independent counsel law could be changed to state that the
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Attorney General's and the Department of Justice's powers under the
Classified Information Procedures Act belong to independent counsel
acting within their prosecutorial jurisdictions. The law could also bar
the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and the Department from
making presentations as amicus curiae in independent counsel cases,
proceedings, and appeals, unless the independent counsel requested their
participation. These changes would not be possible, of course, without
the support of Congress and the President. Unsuccessful attempts to
strengthen the independent counsel law in this fashion would also, by
negative implication, support views that the current version of the law
does not already give this power to independent counsel and, more
importantly, it would embody a clear political judgment that the law
should not transfer such power to an independent counsel.
Another path to the same empowerment end, but one that is more
direct and immediate, is for an independent counsel to read the current
statute literally. A literal reading would be in line with the laws broad
and stated purpose of replacing the Attorney General and the Depart-
ment of Justice with an independent investigator and prosecutor in
certain conflict of interest cases. An independent counsel could assert
to an Attorney General-ideally in private and early in the independent
counsel's tenure, when the issues are still somewhat theoretical-the
view that the appointment of independent counsel brought with it the
full prosecutorial power and independence that is explicit in the statute's
general provisions. This independent counsel could, in a case with
national security implications, decide after consulting with and receiving
input from relevant national security experts whether classified
information should be used to further law enforcement objectives. He
could tell the Attorney General that Department of Justice personnel up
to and including the Office of the Solicitor General will be the indepen-
dent counsel's to deploy, with care and with wisdom informed by their
expert legal input, in litigation when he represents the United States.
In short, independent counsel could seek to enlist the Department and
perhaps even the Attorney General while making clear that the
alternative to cooperation is the legal mandate-the law's require-
ment-that the Attorney General and the Department of Justice stay out
of the independent counsel's way.
In all likelihood, however, this empowered (or at least emboldened)
independent counsel and the disempowered (or at least disconcerted)
Attorney General would be heading for a showdown.
542 [Vol. 49
AG POWER & CONDUCT IN IC CASES
V. PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES OF EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL
The experience of any independent counsel investigation, like the
experience of an ordinary state or federal criminal investigation, will be
defined in large part by its precise facts. These include the identities of
the investigation's subjects and targets, the nature of the allegations
that are investigated, the investigative methods that are employed, the
kinds of evidence that develop, and the ultimate outcomes, including any
indictments, trials, convictions, appeals, and other litigations that ensue.
Whatever the factual context, however, an independent counsel who
takes the statutory scheme literally or reads it expansively is likely to
provoke a range of reactions from the Attorney General and the
executive branch.
A. The Attorney General's Interactions with an Empowered
Independent Counsel
To any Attorney General, the existence of the independent counsel
law, with its requirement that the Attorney General ask a special court
to appoint a lawyer outside the structure of the Department of Justice
to do what otherwise would be its work, is, in part, an insult. The
independent counsel law was first enacted (and subsequently re-enacted
on three occasions) because of the general belief, at least in Congress,
that Attorneys General and the Department of Justice could not always
be trusted to conduct these criminal investigations with integrity and
credibility. The statute embodies public mistrust in the Office of the
Attorney General, the offices of other Department of Justice political
appointees, and the positions of the career prosecutors and law
enforcement agents who actually conduct federal criminal investiga-
tions.10 1 Thus, any individual of integrity and professionalism who
happens to occupy one of those statutorily mistrusted positions has some
basis to feel, if only at a subconscious level, irked at this "you can't be
trusted" message. An actual independent counsel, who comes to his
federal law enforcement assignment as the embodiment of this mistrust,
is the personification of the insult. All of this, we may assume, makes
a typical Attorney General reluctant to pull the trigger that will make
that independent counsel happen. If the independent counsel were
understood to come to the job fully empowered and having assumed the
full range of power and legal authority that the Attorney General
101. See HARRIGER, supra note 20, at 144.
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ordinarily would possess, any natural reluctance to pull the trigger
would be all the greater.
Greater reluctance could be, at least to the extent that it stops short
of ceasing to follow the law, a salutary development. Some decisions by
Attorneys General to request an independent counsel appointment have
been criticized for being too reflexive, or for overstating conflict of
interest concerns that led to various independent counsel appoint-
ments."e2 Attorneys General themselves have, as investigtions were
ongoing, criticized independent counsel for investigating and prosecuting
activities that were within or at least related to the jurisdictions they
received from the court based upon Attorney General requests.1" If
any of these criticisms are valid, a clearer Attorney General-level under-
standing that an independent counsel appointment disables the
Department of Justice from almost any related activity could be
educational and sobering. In some contexts it might lead Attorneys
General to make fewer discretionary as opposed to mandatory requests
for independent counsel appointments. From the perspective of critics
and skeptics regarding the value of independent counsel investigations,
this deterrence is desirable.
Some independent counsel appointments are, of course, virtually
required. When an Attorney General receives credible allegations of
criminal conduct by a person who is covered by the statute and those
allegations cannot be fully investigated within the statute's time limit
for preliminary investigations, the Attorney General is required to ask
the court to appoint an independent counsel. In these instances the
hope would be that an Attorney General who understood and adjusted
102. See, e.g., Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy,
33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 463, 479 (1996).
103. See, e.g., Sam Vincent Meddis, Barr Rips into Iran-Contra Cases; Prosecutions
Called "Unfair," USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1992, at A2 (reporting Attorney General William
Barrs claims in an interview he gave following a federal jury verdict convicting former CIA
official Clair George of lying to Congress, that
[p]eople in this Iran-contra matter have been prosecuted for the kind of conduct
that would not have been considered criminal or prosecutable by the Department
of Justice, applying standards that we have applied for decades to every citizen
.... Im concerned about a number... of the prosecutive theories that were
trotted out on Clair George .... It didn't appear to me [that George's character,
past record and the seriousness of the offense] were given much weight .... )
Id. at A2; James Rowley, Prosecutors: Attorney General Could be Prejudicing Weinberger
Jurors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 1992, available on 1992 WL 5330379 (reporting the
lead prosecutor's statement in court the next day: "I would have thought that the attorney
general of the United States... would be concerned about the effect he might have as the
nation's top law enforcement officer... on a jury selected 2 1/2 weeks after he gave an
extensive interview.") (ellipses in original).
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to the Department's relative powerlessness vis-&-vis that independent
counsel within his area of jurisdiction might respond to the inevitable by
making genuine efforts to communicate with, and thus to engage
constructively, the independent counsel during the course of his work.
The scope and quality of this relationship would be in the discretion of
the independent counsel. Some independent counsel will never "hit it
off' with some Attorneys General because of who they are (for example,
a close colleague of the independent counsel's subject), because of what
and where they have been both professionally and personally, and
because of other facts that may be unique to an investigation. But other
independent counsel may try todevelop a pattern of contacts and a level
of trust in Attorneys General, especially if it becomes better understood
that the independent counsel has the upper or only hand with regard to
the conduct of his investigation.
B. Presidential Reactions to an Empowered Independent Counsel
From the perspective of an independent counsel, his freedom from
Department of Justice interference and his working relationship with the
Attorney General are a major, but not the only, important aspect of his
interactions with the permanent institutions of the United States
government. Presidential and White House attitudes and conduct can
affect the independent counsel's work either directly or through contacts
with those who are affected by the independent counsel investigation.
An understanding in the White House that an independent counsel is,
at the expense of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice,
fully empowered in his investigative sphere will produce greater hostility
to the idea of independent counsel and to the work of any independent
counsel who is appointed to investigate executive branch personnel.
Presidential and White House mistrust will focus in the first instance
on the Attorney General. At least since the Independent Counsel
Statute was re-enacted in 1994, White House ire has been the standard
response whenever Attorney General Reno has triggered the court
appointment of an independent counsel.' ° If it becomes understood
(merely through theoretical discussions or concretely through indepen-
dent counsel assertions of power that go unchallenged by Attorneys
General or that are upheld by the courts) that an independent counsel
fully supplants the traditional Department of Justice role and functions
104. See generally Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton Asks Reno to Stay as Attorney
General, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1996, at Al ("Clinton waited more than five weeks after his
re-election to guarantee Reno's job security, a drawn-out ordeal many in Washington
interpreted as a sign of his unhappiness with her decision to seek four [sic] independent
counsel investigations into his administration during her tenure").
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as they relate to his investigative work-if the White House comes to
believe, in other words, that the independent counsel "gorilla" weighs the
proverbial eight hundred pounds-White House mistrust of Attorneys
General may grow. "Why did you do this to us?" will become, with more
anguish, "Why did you do this to us?"
Greater separation of the Attorney General from the White House may
be desirable from the perspective of those who think that "White House"
political concerns have come to play too great a role in defining the work
of Attorneys General and the Department of Justice. However, it will
be a negative development to the extent that it causes executive branch
personnel, who fear that their action could lead to an independent
counsel appointment, not to inform the Department of Justice about, or
to cooperate with investigations into, possible crimes by colleagues. It
also could generally harm the pattern of contacts and the quality of
communication between the White House and the Department of Justice,
which are essential to the executive branch's orderly conduct of its public
business.
Less significant, but still predictable, would be the effect of indepen-
dent counsel "empowerment" on presidential and White House attitudes
toward the independent counsel himself. Although some Presidents and
other executive branch personnel in the past requested the appointments
of independent counsel to investigate them,"° these "requests" were
formalities that acquiesced in and tried to shape to the requesters'
benefits the politics and the public perceptions of matters that were
already controversial. No one, it seems fair to say, has genuinely desired
105. See, e.g., Ronald J. Ostrow & Robert L. Jackson, Deaver Calls for Inquiry by
Independent Counsel; Conflict-of-Interest Charge Prompts Move by Ex-Reagan Aide, L.
TOMS, Apr. 29, 1986, at 1 (noting that Michael "Deaver's tactic of calling for an
investigation himself parallels that used by [Edwin] Meese [in 1984] and former Labor
Secretary Raymond J. Donovan when pressure was building for independent counsel to
investigate their financial dealings"); Marcus Stern, Meese Asks Full Inquiry; Calls for
Special Prosecutor in Bid to Refute Allegations, SAN DIEGO UNION & Ti., Mar. 23, 1984,
at Al (reporting Attorney General-designate Meese's request for appointment of an
independent counsel and the Department of Justice's commencement, prior to the Meese
request, of an investigation into his failure to report a $15,000 loan on his required federal
financial disclosure forms); Donovan Denies Allegations, Calls for Special Prosecutor, DOW
JONES NEWS SERV., Dec. 22, 1981; cf Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clinton Seeks Special Counsel
on Whitewater; President is Backing Down in an Effort to Protect the Rest of His Agenda,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1994, at A3 (reporting President Clinton's request, in the period
between the 1987 Independent Counsel Statute's expiration and its re-enactment later in
1994, that Attorney General Reno appoint a special prosecutor within the Department of
Justice to investigate Whitewater allegations against the President); JAMES B. STEWART,
BLOOD SPORT: THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVERSARIES 368-76 (1996) (chronicling the
deliberations leading up to President Clinton's January 1994 decision to ask the Attorney
General to appoint a Whitewater special prosecutor).
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or grown to like his or her personal independent counsel. To these
White House eyes, an empowered independent counsel will look worse
than one that can be constrained in various ways by the Department of
Justice, even though these eyes already see the status quo independent
counsel as more than bad enough.
If tension and mistrust regarding an empowered independent counsel
do come to a head during an investigation,'O' it will be through the
safety valve that is explicitly provided in the statute itself: the Attorney
General's power to fire an independent counsel. The law provides that
an independent counsel may be removed from office for "good cause."' °7
The law does not define what constitutes "good cause,""0 and in the
more than twenty independent counsel investigations to date, no
Attorney General has addressed the scope of, much less exercised, this
power.' No independent counsel, however, has claimed or attempted
to exercise aggressively the full range of legal authority that arguably
is granted under the current statute. If one did, and particularly if one
did so in the context of investigating the President himself, that
independent counsel could face dismissal.
C. The Value of Pushing Showdowns Up into the Light
An independent counsel who exercises the full range of power and
authority that the law provides now or in a future iteration may not
automatically face dismissal. This independent counsel thus may obtain
indictments and criminal convictions or acquittals in the ordinary course
of his work, and he may have significant investigative findings to report
to the appointing court at the natural conclusion of that work. In the
alternative, the outcome, at least in the presidential-level investigations
that are closest to the core scenario that led to enactment of the
independent counsel law, may be that the independent counsel is fired
by the Attorney General for conduct she regards as good cause for
106. Opposition to the notion of empowered independent counsel also could come to a
head in the political process. Congress and the President could enact amendments that
would narrow the powers that the independent counsel law currently allocates to these
special investigators and prosecutors. Congress also could choose not to reenact the statute
when it reaches its five-year sunset provision in June 1999. Congress and the President
also could reenact it at that time in narrower form.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 596(aX1). The Attorney General may also remove an independent
counsel for "physical or mental disability' or for "any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties." Id.
108. Id. Among the many interesting questions regarding this provision that remain
entirely open is whether a direct presidential order to fire an independent counsel
constitutes good cause for an Attorney General to do so.
109. See generally O'Sullivan, supra note 102, at 495.
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dismissal. A truly independent counsel may, in other words, provoke a
showdown with the Attorney General, a showdown that the Attorney
General is legally empowered to win.u °
Although an Attorney General-independent counsel showdown is not
to be desired, it would produce general benefits. At the most basic level,
it would inform the public that the matters at issue between these two
experienced, professional law enforcement officials were of great
moment.
A showdown would also signal the political branches. It would tell the
executive and legislative branches that a fundamental moment of crisis
has been reached much more clearly than the back-and-forth of
litigation, turf, power, judgment, public relations, and privilege
invocation disputes between independent counsel and the regular
executive branch currently do. For Congress, in cases involving the
conduct of senior government officials, this moment of crisis-the
dismissal of the independent counsel and the resulting absence of an
independent counsel to deal with the alleged official misconduct under
investigation-will mean the need to decide whether to proceed with the
constitutionally-prescribed remedy of impeachment and conviction based
on all the legal and political considerations that necessarily are part of
the decision. For those who remain skeptical of the constitutionality of
the independent counsel law, this path of an independent counsel
investigation aborted by his own dismissal travels from Article II (the
Attorney General's power over criminal prosecution, a core executive
function), through the dubious terrain of an independent counsel, and
back to Article I (the congressional power to impeach and convict).'
For those whose concerns about independent counsel are not constitu-
tional but pragmatic, the dismissed independent counsel will at least
have been less expensive and long-lived than he could have been.
VI. CONCLUSION: FROM WHENCE WE CAME (YES, WATERGATE)
In many respects the Independent Counsel Statute is the result of a
post-Watergate legislative effort to ensure that what President Nixon did
to Archibald Cox and the Watergate Special Prosecution Force in
October 1973-not a massacre, but an unsuccessful attempted massa-
cre-can never happen again. The statute is an ongoing effort to ensure
110. The statute does give a dismissed independent counsel standing to challenge that
action in court, see 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3), but an Attorney General who explained the
grounds for dismissal as the independent counsel's "failure to follow Department of Justice
policy" might well prevail. It also is far from clear that a court could constitutionally
reinstate an independent counsel who had been fired by an Attorney General.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I & IL.
548 [Vol. 49
AG POWER & CONDUCT IN IC CASES
the presence of a prosecutor who will be both in power and ultimately in
public credibility akin to Professor Cox in his service from May through
October 1973.
What we have learned from almost twenty years of experience with
independent counsel appointed under the various versions of the statute
is that the permanent government can get in the way of this effort.
Statutory silence, statutory ambiguity, seemingly minor statutory
exceptions, and restraint by independent counsel have combined to
permit Attorneys General and the Department of Justice to undercut in
myriad and unexpected ways the investigative and prosecutorial force of
an independent counsel.112 Experience shows us that the statute,
notwithstanding its clear concept and its sweeping transfer of power, has
not succeeded in transferring the Attorney General's full prosecutorial
power to the independent counsel who supposedly has been assigned to
take the Attorney General's place in a particular high-level prosecution
in the interests of promoting public trust in law enforcement.
What the statute, or at least today's restrained interpretations of it,
may be overlooking is the full lesson of the Watergate experience. In
that situation, the special prosecutor system worked well not simply
because independent persons from outside the Nixon Administration
were brought in to investigate and were given the general powers they
needed to do the job. It worked because Attorneys General stayed out
of the special prosecutors' way and refrained from interfering with the
investigations and litigation.'
Attorney General restraint regarding, and, to go further, Attorney
General communication with and trust in an outsider who has supplant-
ed the Attorney General's institutional role as federal investigator and
prosecutor, are matters of character and judgment. From the very
beginning of the spring 1973 Senate hearings on Elliot Richardson's
nomination to be Attorney General,"4 the power and independence of
the Watergate special prosecutor were defined by Richardson's personal
commitment to ensuring the special prosecutor's power and indepen-
dence. In a sense, Congress and President Carter attempted through the
112. The original nomenclature of the statute-"special prosecutor"--communicates the
point: an independent counsel clearly is special, but he cannot fully be the prosecutor that
the statute envisions so long as the Attorney General continues to exercise various powers
that can complicate, if not frustrate, his efforts to prosecute.
113. Saturday, October 20, 1973, was, of course, the most notable exception to this
general record of restraint.
114. Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to be Attorney General: Hearings Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong. 1-287 (1973).
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original Ethics in Government Act of 1978115 to enact a system that
would produce a special prosecutor like Archibald Cox. What they may
not have understood as clearly, however, was that the other element of
the successful Watergate formula was Attorney General Richardson."'
An empowered independent counsel could be a return to the Cox-
Richardson model if the law is so understood in the Office of the
Attorney General. Independent counsel would then succeed or fail,
behaving professionally or irresponsibly, on their own. This is where the
independent counsel law meant to be from its inception.
Empowering independent counsel along the lines of the Cox-Richard-
son model also would risk triggering, in the highest level cases, a Nixon-
Bork-Cox-type ending: a showdown between a President, acting through
115. Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5
U.S.C. app. 4, 28 U.S.C.).
116. Professor Cox wrote later that during 1973 he and Richardson "enjoyed an easy
informal relationship, each confident of the basic integrity of the other, even when his place
in the Cabinet and mine as Special Prosecutor came into opposition." ARCHIBALD COX, THE
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1987); accord id. at 3 (describing Richardson as "a man
of great experience and unimpeachable integrity.").
Cox's biographer also recounts in vivid detail the bond of trust and pattern of confidential
communication that Cox and Richardson shared during the Watergate investigation. See
KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 237-38 (1997) (describing
Richardson and Cox's discussions regarding the scope of his jurisdiction as Watergate
special prosecutor); id. at 294 (describing Richardson's stated neutrality in disputes
between Cox and President Nixon); id. at 295 ("Richardson nevertheless engaged in loose,
informal chats and power brokering with his old labor law professor . .. ."); id. at 296
("Richardson would tell the president's lawyers, 'Well, Cox isn't a demon. He is a good
man. Why don't you call him up and talk to him about it?'"); id. at 297 ("Each time a
complaint or worry reached the attorney general's office from the White House, Elliott
would call Archie or invite him over to the Justice Department and lay out the matter
forthrightly. Cox observed several things: Richardson never hid the ball; he seemed to
trust Cox; but at the same time, the attorney general remained consistently loyal to the
president's position."); id. at 313 ("Cox saw his former student a good bit during [October
19731."); id. at 318-20 (describing "their old-fashioned approach and all of its 'corny' notions
of trust."); id. at 377 (describing Cox's 1993 reflections on "how different things might have
been if someone other than Elliot Richardson was attorney general, someone whom I could
not deal with on an absolute level of trust. I'm not sure things would have worked out the
same at all.'").
Richardson's accounts of his relationship with Cox are in full agreement. See generally
Elliot Richardson, Foreword to id. at ix-xii; ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE:
GOVERNMENT, POLrIcS AND THE INDIDUAL IN AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 35-47 (1976);
cf ELLIOT RICHARDSON, REFLECTIONS OF A RADICAL MODERATE 17 (1996) (recounting his
1973 advice to Nixon White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt: "'You ought... to tell Archie
Cox to send over a truck and load it up with all the material he and his staff could possible
want.' In that event, if anything damaging was found, Nixon could issue a public apology
and couple it with a convincing expression of penitence. The American public, I thought,
would be more than likely to forgive and forget.").
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his Attorney General's power to dismiss, and an independent counsel.
If that happens, the political process will need to determine who was
right and who did wrong. Watergate itself demonstrates that the
political process can assess and respond appropriately-all the way to
voting articles of impeachment if need be-to an improper executive
branch effort to terminate an independent counsel's investigation.
In the meantime, to facilitate the ordinary governmental processes of
the United States, we should recognize, and not with despair, that our
current statutory arrangement may already make independent counsel
fully the United States.

